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As a result of the sustained and evolving threat from international and domestic terrorism, 
Government agendas are seeking to increase the extent to which vulnerable sites such as 
crowded places are protected from terrorist attacks.  Recent events have highlighted the 
need for crowded places to be considered at higher risk, with plots and attacks in the UK 
alone focussing on such places in Birmingham, London, Glasgow, Exeter and 
Manchester.  The vast majority of potential targets already exist and are therefore more 
complex to protect against an attack than by designing in counter-terrorism measures 
(CTM‟s) at the design and planning stages, although both result in complex trade-offs and 
scenarios.  The aim of this research is to therefore examine the complexities inherent in 
ensuring crowded places are appropriately and proportionately protected from terrorist 
attacks, as well as identifying the trade-offs involved when designing in CTM‟s and retro-
fitting existing locations.  The benefits of and opportunities for innovation are also 
discussed, utilising examples from both the UK and USA where innovative technologies 
and practices have enabled publicly acceptable and proportionate CTM‟s to be 
incorporated into site designs.  Empirical research was conducted alongside an extensive 
literature review.  Case studies are used to illustrate the implications for decision makers 
involved in protecting crowded places.  The results highlight that despite vast 
complexities existing when incorporating CTM‟s into existing or planned crowded 
places, a lack of informed and appropriate guidance for key decision makers on best 
practice is exacerbating this situation.  As well as this, there is a lack of understanding of 
the inter-connectedness of the threats that are faced and the measures that are used to 
mitigate them.  However, examples demonstrate that such complexities can lead to 
innovative solutions, with the Emirates Stadium in London incorporating a number of 
effective yet publicly acceptable CTM‟s into its design.  Conclusions state that inherent 
complexities in such projects can act as catalysts for innovation. With the growing need 
for more comprehensive guidance on CTM‟s that are available for protecting crowded 
places, new research is examining the systemic implications and relative value of those 
measures. This will produce guidance for key decision makers and inform future 
legislation, guidelines and codes of practice.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A vast array of hazards, threats and potential major accidents pose a significant risk to 
society.  For the purpose of this research, a threat will be defined as any action that is 
carried out with intent and malice and causes or threatens to cause damage to society and 
the environment that it operates within (Harre-Young et al. 2009).  Threats such as crime 
and terrorism have therefore come to the forefront of political agendas due to their very 
nature.  Hazards; naturally occurring phenomena such as flooding and major accidents, 
such as the explosion at the Buncefield Oil Depot in the UK in 2005, have also 
highlighted the fragility and vulnerability of the built environments in which we live and 
work. 
 
Protecting built environments that are vulnerable to such a wide range of phenomena is a 
complex task, especially within urban settings that contain crowded and public places.  
However, the threat posed by terrorism has come to the forefront of modern political 
agendas, as those involved in planning and carrying out such plots seek to harm those 
who use crowded places and the infrastructure and buildings that are integral to societal 
well-being.  It is within this context, that this research seeks to identify the complexities 
involved in preventing terrorist attacks from being carried out in crowded places and how 
innovation is aiding this task. 
 
Defining Terrorism 
There is no universal definition of terrorism.  The process of doing so is a major political 
issue, in which the complexity centres on the context in which the acts of violence were 
carried out and seen (Hoffman 2004).  Despite this, the UK Government has defined 
terrorism within the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK Parliament 2000: 1) as “the use or threat of 
action where (a) the action falls within subsection (2), (b) the use or threat is designed to 
influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the 
use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause.  (2) Action falls within this subsection if it (a) involves serious violence against a 
person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person's life, other than 
that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety 
of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or 
seriously to disrupt an electronic system”.  
 
This research therefore explores the complexity surrounding countering terrorism 
according to this definition and more specifically, in relation to the threat faced by 
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED‟s) and the use of hostile vehicle 
mitigation measures. 
 
The Threat 
Terrorism is not a new threat.  Within the UK and according to the UK‟s Security Service 
(MI5), the threat derives from three areas, those being Irish-related terrorism, 
international terrorism and domestic extremism (Security Service 2009a).  Irish-related 
terrorism caused over 3,500 deaths between 1969 and 1998 (HM Government 2009).  
Although no terrorist attacks have been carried out on the British mainland since the 
Belfast Agreement of 1998, it has been widely publicised that a threat from Irish-related 
terrorism remains, especially with recent events highlighting that there is continued intent 
to disrupt the peace process, with two members of the Armed Forces and one Police 
Officer of Northern Ireland being killed in separate attacks in March 2009.  The threat 
faced from domestic extremism encompasses groups who are motivated other than by the 
situation regarding Northern Ireland and according to the Security Service (2009b), does 
not pose a significant threat.  However, a serious threat is faced from international 
terrorism, primarily from Al‟Qa-ida leadership and their immediate associates (HM 
Government 2009).  Al‟Qa-ida is widely known for orchestrating the terrorist attacks in 
the United States of America (USA) on September 11
th
 2001.  According to the 
Department of Homeland Security (2007), the threat of terrorism that is faced in the USA 
primarily comes from Al‟Qa-ida as well, although a range of other groups and individuals 
pose a threat, including domestic groups such as animal rights extremists. 
 
Within the UK however, Clarke and Soria (2009) state that there have been 16 evident 
cases involving terrorism since 2001.  Although Al‟Qa-ida became synonymous with the 
attacks of September 11
th
 in the USA, a UK plot was disrupted prior to these attacks in 
2000 and more recently, a major plot was uncovered and disrupted in April 2009.  
Analysis of Clarke and Soria‟s (2009) research, as well as these two additional plots, 
highlights that of the 18 cases, 12 involved actual planned or carried out attacks, with 
seven focussing on crowded places and 6 involving transport networks (only one involved 
both).  This highlights a trend that focuses on crowded places due to their very nature and 
that they are perceived to be unprotected targets (Coaffee et al. 2008).  The UK‟s counter 
terrorism strategy (HM Government 2009) proposes that over time a new form of 
terrorism has emerged, yet it is argued, especially in relation to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11
th
 2001, whether this was a “point of change or the moment of realisation of 
what had been taking place” (Briggs 2005: 10).  Nonetheless, the attacks that occurred in 
2001 certainly hastened the development of strategies and measures to counter the threat 
that is faced from terrorism. 
 
 
COUNTER-TERRORISM 
 
Since 2002, the USA has had a „National Strategy for Homeland Security‟ (Department 
of Homeland Security 2007) and since 2003, the UK has had a strategy, known as 
CONTEST.  In 2006, the strategy became publicly available and showed that the UK‟s 
approach was based on four strands, those being „Pursue‟, „Prevent‟, „Protect‟ and 
„Prepare‟ (HM Government 2009).  „Pursue‟ focuses on the detection, investigation and 
disruption of terrorist networks and activities; „Prevent‟ focuses on stopping people 
becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism; „Protect‟ focuses on reducing the 
vulnerability of crowded places, critical national infrastructure and borders; and „Prepare‟ 
involves mitigating the impact of an attack when it cannot be stopped (ibid).  Under 
„Protect‟, security advice and programmes have been developed and have impacted a 
small number of construction projects to date, such as football stadia and shopping 
centres, where Counter Terrorism Security Advisors have become involved in projects 
and provided appropriate and proportionate security advice.  CONTEST is non-statutory 
and so there is no legal requirement to ensure that CTM‟s are integrated into sites. 
However, CONTEST does have potentially major implications on the UK‟s construction 
sector and the built environments, covering areas such as project specification, building 
design, urban planning and facilities management (Harre-Young et al. 2009). With the 
threat of terrorism being higher for crowded places and CONTEST resulting in the 
protection of such places, a vast array of CTM‟s are being used to mitigate the impact and 
reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack. 
 
Counter-Terrorism Measures 
Particular approaches and practices can lead to a reduction in vulnerability.  For example, 
Elliot (2009) states that in relation to building and site designs, achieving the following 
objectives can aid in reducing vulnerabilities: 
1. Deflect a terrorist attack by showing that the chance of an attack being successful is 
reduced through the layout, security and defences used 
2. Disguise valuable parts of a site or building so that an attack fails to make its desired 
impact 
3. Disperse potential targets so that an attack could not impact all of the possibilities 
4. Stop an attack from reaching its target through the use of physical measures 
5. Blunt the impacts of an attack should it reach the target area 
 
Broader design principles, such as the above, can aid in reducing the risk of an attack and 
mitigating its impact.  Specific products or materials are used in order to fulfil these 
objectives as, for example, vehicle barriers can be used to show that a site has been 
secured and therefore reduce the likelihood of an attack; can stop an attack by blocking 
access and/or restricting and controlling movement; and blunt an attack by modifying the 
structure of a building to mitigate the impact an attack may have. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this research, a CTM is defined as any product or course of action, where all 
or part of its specification is to reduce the likelihood and/or mitigate the impact of a 
terrorist attack.  Despite calls for the use of such measures to be halted and for the threat 
of terrorism to be tackled without such manipulation of the built environment (Lazell 
2008), CTM‟s are being used, especially in crowded public places.  CTM‟s are 
emblematic as they provide a tangible aspect to countering terrorism and how the public 
is being protected from the various threats that are faced.  However, using such measures 
to show that the threat and the safety of the public are being taken seriously can have an 
adverse affect by highlighting that there is a need to feel threatened and unsafe (Boddy 
2007; Coaffee et al. 2009).  This highlights the importance of proportionate and 
acceptable CTM‟s being chosen on an individual basis, as the needs of each site or 
building vary considerably.  Other factors that influence the choice of measures include 
whether they are being retro-fitted or incorporated into designs, the depth and number of 
utilities, pipelines etc, the cost, public acceptability and the level of vulnerability that is 
being addressed. 
 
Despite the complexity involved in protecting crowded places, a variety of CTM‟s can be 
used to reduce the likelihood and mitigate the impacts of an attack effectively and 
counter-terrorism intelligence shows that the use of CTM‟s is having an impact and 
contributing to the displacement of the threats (Forman 2009a).  It is argued that the most 
effective way of mitigating the impact and reducing the likelihood of a terrorist VBIED 
attack is through the use of „stand-off‟, which is the distance between a potential 
explosive device and its target (Little 2004; Regan 2006; Coaffee and Bosher 2008).  The 
„stand-off‟ is enforced through the use of CTM‟s that block vehicles from getting within 
the defined distance.  Whilst stand-off is arguably the most effective CTM for mitigating 
the impact of a VBIED, it only mitigates that particular threat, as terrorist attacks such as 
those witnessed on the September 11
th
 2001 in the USA and the use of person-borne 
improvised explosive device (PBIED) attacks would not be prevented by using such a 
measure.  Lakha and Moore (2002) argue that it is right to question whether it is “possible 
to design a building to withstand an impact from a plane not yet invented in a scenario no 
one can imagine, not once, but twice” and this highlights two issues, those being the 
innovation of terrorists themselves and the methods and tactics that they use; and the 
likelihood of scenarios upon which the incorporation and use of CTM‟s are based.  In 
relation to the innovation of terrorists and their methods and tactics, as Dolnik (2007) 
argues, no matter what measures are used, the public will have to accept a level of risk, as 
the methods adopted will evolve to overcome the measures used to mitigate terrorist 
attacks. 
 
Regarding the probability or likelihood of scenarios, Lakha and Moore (2002) highlight 
that a scenario such as that seen on September 11
th
 2001 was never planned for and as 
Barker (2003) argues, there were no practical building-specific security measures that 
would have prevented such an attack.  To mitigate the impacts of such an unprecedented 
attack, it can be argued that organisational or „soft‟ measures would be the most effective 
CTM, through incorporating redundancy into systems, incorporating business continuity 
planning into the organisations to aid in preparedness, response and recovery etc, which 
would reduce the impacts of an attack.  This highlights the need for informed guidance on 
assessing the threat that is faced at sites on an individual basis and which CTM‟s are the 
most appropriate, proportionate and effective considering the threat that is faced. 
 
  
DESIGNING IN AND RETRO-FITTING MEASURES 
 
Whilst „stand-off‟ may be the most effective measure for countering a particular threat, 
incorporating it, as well as other CTM‟s, into site designs and retro-fitting them into 
existing sites presents a number of issues. Some of the key issues include the threat of 
terrorism itself, varying stakeholder requirements and resulting trade-offs, understanding 
and knowledge of CTM‟s, the acceptability of CTM‟s and the site and local utilities.  The 
threat of terrorism itself is an issue, as perceptions of its nature, permanence and 
proportionality in relation to addressing the threat can vary considerably.  For example, 
there is widespread criticism that counter-terrorism is being pushed as much more of a 
priority than other hazards and threats, even though terrorism is distinctly less likely to 
occur.  Not only does this have implications for the design and functioning of public 
buildings and spaces, but also, arguably, leaves them vulnerable to those hazards and 
threats that are much more likely to occur (Little 2004; Regan 2006; and Coaffee et al 
2009).  Investigation is also needed to understand whether the use of measures to reduce 
the likelihood and mitigate the impact of one hazard or threat increases the risk of another 
occurring.  For example, questions could be asked as to whether the use of barriers, 
barricades and bollards in order to prevent a hostile vehicle gaining access to a building 
increase the risk and severity of flooding at neighbouring locations. 
 
The use of certain CTM‟s can also result in trade-offs that require the demands of 
multiple stakeholders to be properly understood and negotiated, with a final decision 
meeting the needs of all those concerned as much as possible.  Using „stand-off‟ as an 
example, enforcing a distance between a building and a potential explosive device will 
require a certain amount of redundant space, which will result in a lower usable floor ratio 
(Then and Loosemore 2006).  This also reflects the differing needs of stakeholders, as the 
end users of the space will want a high usable floor ratio, developers will want to sell 
quickly and for as much as possible, which may be hindered by lower usable floor ratios 
and the evident risk of terrorist threat, whereas security needs will require measures to be 
put in place to reduce the likelihood and mitigate the impact of such an attack. 
 
Levels of understanding and knowledge regarding CTM‟s is also a key issue, as no 
typology exists in order for decision makers to identify what measures are available for 
their use.  There is also a lack of data on the implications of those measures and the value 
that they bring to a development.  If little is known about the most effective ways to 
protect a site and how to use the most appropriate and proportionate measures, then this 
could potentially result in inadequately secure or over-protected and obtrusive sites.  
Acceptability is a key issue, with some sites expecting and requiring the use of obtrusive 
measures, whilst others, such as crowded public places, needing more inconspicuous 
measures (Coaffee et al. 2009).  However, inconspicuous or „invisible‟ CTM‟s could 
potentially present areas as being insecure (ibid) and reduce the extent to which the 
measures act as a deterrent. 
 
Local utilities contribute significantly to the complexities involved in protecting potential 
targets.  A number of services can be present under the surface of developed sites, which 
results in their relocation and/or diversion, the use of CTM‟s requiring shallower 
foundations, or the use of temporary, surface-mounted CTM‟s.  Whilst using CTM‟s that 
are surface mounted or require shallow foundations reduce the costs and difficulties 
associated with diverting services, such measures can be less effective against penetrative 
impact, less publicly acceptable and less effective on undulating ground (Forman 2009b). 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF INNOVATION 
 
Innovation is having a considerable effect for both terrorists and those responsible for 
countering the threat that is faced.  In relation to the nature of the threat and the methods 
of attack being used, terrorists are attempting to establish proven methods of 
circumventing CTM‟s through the use of explosives (Forman 2009a).  However, CTM‟s 
are increasingly being tested not only in relation to their ability to stop penetrative attack, 
but also their responses to explosive charges being detonated on and near them, in order 
to ensure that CTM‟s are not only innovative in their ability to overcome the complexities 
within sites, such as local utilities, but also overcome the efforts of those attempting to 
carry out terrorist attacks.  In relation to varying stakeholder requirements and resulting 
trade-offs, public acceptability of CTM‟s and the issues surrounding site and local 
utilities, innovations in the development of CTM‟s is leading to more publicly acceptable 
and aesthetically pleasing measures, as well as the need for shallower foundations (ibid) 
and therefore, less disruption to the location of local and site services.   
 
Examples of such innovations are evident in the UK and the USA.  In New York, 
innovations in CTM‟s have lead to the development of „tiger traps‟ in public spaces 
(Rogers Marvel Architects 2009), which are areas that are constructed to collapse under 
the pressure of a vehicle, but allow complete access and freedom of movement for the 
public.  Turntables incorporating CTM‟s have also been developed and enable dense 
urban spaces to allow complete public permeability through measures, with the additional 
functionality of being able to rotate in order to let legitimate vehicles through (Rock 12 
Security Architecture 2009).  The Emirates Stadium in London, UK, is held as a model 
for designing in CTM‟s that overcome some of the previously mentioned issues, as large 
hardened letters spelling out „Arsenal‟ have been placed to deny a vehicle-borne attack, as 
have other ornamental features such as large brass cannons, which are the club‟s insignia 
(Coaffee and Bosher 2008).  Figure 1 below shows the letters that have been surface 
mounted and therefore, overcome any potential issues regarding local and site utilities. 
 
Figure 1: Innovative CTMs at Arsenal’s Emirates Stadium, London 
 
 
Whilst CTM‟s that are „designed-in‟ to plans at an early stage cost less and are potentially 
more aesthetically pleasing than those that are retro-fitted (Coaffee and O‟Hare 2008), 
innovations in measures that need to be designed in and retro-fitted must continue, as the 
vast majority of targets already exist and can therefore only be retro-fitted with measures, 
which must conform to the pressures of being publicly acceptable and aesthetically 
pleasing.  Development and innovation in relation to designing in CTM‟s will allow more 
effective ways of protecting potential targets from terrorist attack and could potentially 
lead to lower costs, although little is known about the costs of the measures themselves 
and to a larger extent, what value they bring to a site and for whom. 
 
KNOWLEDGE GAPS 
 
It has been recognised that counter-terrorism strategy and measures themselves are 
having a considerable impact on the built environment (Harre-Young et al. 2009) and yet, 
whilst innovations in protective measures are leading to the development of highly 
effective and more acceptable solutions, not just for counter-terrorism but for the range of 
other hazards and threats that pose a risk to society, key gaps in knowledge are hindering 
further progress.  Vast complexities exist when incorporating such measures into existing 
or planned crowded places, which is being exacerbated by a lack of informed and 
appropriate guidance for key decision makers on the measures that are available, what 
implications they have and for whom, as well as the value, not just cost, that they bring to 
a site.  Through the investigation of the implications and value of those measures, 
fundamental knowledge can be gained and used to inform guidance for key decision 
makers, so that issues such as those identified previously are not frequent occurrences. 
 
As well as this, little is known regarding the inter-connectedness of the hazards and 
threats that are faced and how mitigating them impacts these complex relationships.  The 
innovations of terrorist methods and tactics must also be taken into consideration, as 
terrorists‟ objectives are to cause harm and fear and this will result in determined efforts 
to overcome the use of CTM‟s that protect certain buildings and places.  Whilst it can be 
argued that there is little logic in repeatedly attacking a particular target or type of target, 
as resulting preparedness and security measures will reduce the likelihood of a successful 
attack occurring and mitigate its impact, types of or individual targets could always be at 
risk due to their nature, such as crowded public places.  It is at these sites that the 
understanding of CTM‟s themselves, their value, their implications and both counter-
terrorism and terrorist innovations are of fundamental concern and importance. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Despite considerable complexity existing in the protection of built environments to the 
array of hazards, threats and major accidents that are faced and a lack of understanding in 
relation to the inter-connectedness of the phenomena themselves and the measures that 
are used to mitigate them, the impact that innovation has on the measures that are 
developed to perform such functions is significant.  Such complexity acts as a catalyst for 
innovation, although key gaps remain in regard to the understanding of CTM‟s and how 
they are used.  There is widespread scepticism and criticism regarding the use of such 
measures, however it is argued that informed guidance and knowledge of CTM‟s will aid 
in the construction and security of places that are at risk from the threat of terrorism.  The 
threat is said to be sustained and as argued above, will continue to evolve and increase in 
the use of innovative methods and tactics in order to overcome the measures that have 
been used to protect certain sites, such as crowded public places.  As these sites will 
always be at risk due to their nature, innovations in CTM‟s will be crucial.  Information 
on the measures themselves, their implications and their value, through the use of 
informed guidance for key decision makers, will allow places that require protection to be 
made more resilient through the use of appropriate, proportionate and acceptable 
measures.  Innovation will also result in more cost-effective and acceptable measures to 
be used.  Until this occurs, potential targets are prone to the ineffective use of such 
measures, resulting in under-protected and vulnerable, or over-protected and obtrusive 
public places. 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Thanks go to the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (UK) for being a partner to 
this ongoing research.  The research for this paper and the three year project of which it 
forms a part is supported by an Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
grant, awarded through the Innovative Manufacturing and Construction Research Centre 
at Loughborough University. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Barker, D. (2003) „Terrorism insurance subsidies and social welfare.‟ Journal of Urban 
Economics 54, (2) 328-338 
Boddy, T. (2007) „Architecture Emblematic: Hardened Sites and Softened Symbols‟, In 
Sorkin, M. (ed) Indefensible Space, Abingdon: Routledge.   
Briggs, R. (2005) Joining Forces: From national security to networked security,  London: 
Demos 
Clarke, M., and Soria, V. (2009) „Terrorism in the United Kingdom: Confirming its 
Modus Operandi‟, RUSI Journal, 154, (3) 44-53 
Coaffee, J., and Bosher, L. (2008) „Integrating counter-terrorist resilience into 
sustainability‟, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers: Urban Design and 
Planning 1, (2) 75-83 
Coaffee, J., and O‟Hare, P. (2008) „Urban resilience and national security: the role for 
planning,‟, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers: Urban Design and Planning 
161, (4) 173-182 
Coaffee, J., Moore, C., Fletcher, D., and Bosher, L. (2008) „Resilient design for 
community safety and terror-resistant cities‟, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers: Municipal Engineer, 161, (2) 103-110 
Coaffee, J., O‟Hare, P., and Hawkesworth, M. (2009) „The Visibility of (In)security: The 
Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism‟, Security Dialogue, 40, (4-5) 
489-511 
Department of Homeland Security (2007) National Strategy for Homeland Security 
[online] available from 
<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_2007.pdf> [10 
December 2009] 
Dolnik, A. (2007) „Assessing the Terrorist Threat to Singapore‟s Land Transportation 
Infrastructure.‟ Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 4, (2) 1-22 
Elliot, C. (2009) „Introduction.‟ In Cormie, D., Mays, G., and Smith, P. (eds) Blast effects 
on buildings (2
nd
 edition).  London: Thomas Telford  
Forman, P. (2009a) Presentation on Hostile Vehicle Mitigation,  Transport Research 
Laboratory, Crowthorne, UK.  13 November 2009 
Forman, P. (2009b) „Vehicle-borne threats and the principles of hostile vehicle 
mitigation.‟ In Cormie, D., Mays, G., and Smith, P. (eds) Blast effects on buildings (2nd 
edition).  London: Thomas Telford 
Harre-Young, S., Bosher, L., Dainty, A., and Glass, J. (2009) „The implications of the 
UK‟s counter-terrorism strategy on the construction sector‟.  In Dainty, A. (ed) 
Proceedings of the 25
th
 Annual ARCOM Conference.  7-9 September 2009, Nottingham, 
UK, 1285-1294 
Hoffman, P. (2004) „Human Rights and Terrorism‟, Human Rights Quarterly, 26 (4), 
932-955 
HM Government (2009) The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International 
Terrorism,  London: The Stationery Office 
Lakha, R., and Moore, T. (2002) (eds) Tolley’s Handbook of Disaster and Emergency 
Management: Principles and Practice.  Croydon: NexisLexis 
Lazell, M. (2008) Counterterrorism competition blasted [online] available from 
<http://www.bdonline.co.uk/story.asp?sectioncode=426&storycode=3128148> [09 
October 2009] 
Little, R. G. (2004) „Holistic Strategy for Urban Security‟, Journal of Infrastructure 
Systems, 10, (2) 52-59 
Regan, M. (2006) „Blast Proof City,‟, Planning in London: The Journal of the London 
Planning and Development Forum, 58, 22-24 
Rock 12 Security Architecture (2009) Innovative Streetscape Security Devices [online] 
available from <http://www.rock12.com> [22 November 2009] 
Rogers Marvel Architects (2009) Battery Park City Streetscapes and Security [online] 
available from <http://www.rogersmarvel.com/BatteryParkCityStreetscapes.html> [22 
November 2009] 
Security Service (2009a) Terrorism [online] available from 
<http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/terrorism.html> [09 October 2009] 
Security Service (2009b) Domestic Extremism [online] available from 
<http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/domestic-extremism.html> [09 October 2009] 
Then, S. K., and Loosemore, M. (2006) „Terrorism prevention, preparedness, and 
response in built facilities‟, Facilities, 24, (5/6) 157-176 
UK Parliament (2000) Great Britain Parliament. Terrorism Act 2000, London: HMSO 
